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Highlights: 
 In a public goods experiment, we investigate if individuals will unilaterally provide a 
sanctioning institution 
 Only individuals who give themselves the ‘right’ to punish can do so 
 Sanctioning need not be provided at group level; individuals can, and do, provide 
sanctioning in groups 
 Sanctioning is effective at raising cooperation when its provision is costless 
 However, even a negligible monetary provision cost leads to counterproductive use of 
sanctioning 
 
Abstract 
In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will 
provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose independently whether they 
will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave 
themselves the “right” to sanction can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution 
may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting 
unilaterally are able to provide sanctioning institutions that effectively raise cooperation. The 
effectiveness of the institution, however, depends on whether the “right” to sanction entails a 
monetary cost or not.  
 
Keywords: public goods, experiment, punishment, institution formation, unilateral provision, 
cooperation 
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1. Introduction  
A common feature of most studies of public good games is that the institution proposed to 
increase contributions is provided exogenously and the emphasis is placed on the conditions 
which effectively help to alleviate the free rider problem (see Chaudhuri, 2011 for a recent 
survey). Of late, there is growing interest in how the institution comes into being. This issue is 
important because the formation of the institution is subject to a second-order free rider 
problem. Others may profit from the institution but they prefer someone else to provide it (see 
Oliver, 1980).1 The literature on the endogenous formation of institutions provides an answer 
assuming that the institutional choice mechanism is voting: there is ample experimental 
evidence showing that in many cases, the outcome of voting is a sanctioning institution.2 This 
approach however assumes that the group has the capacity to organize the voting mechanism 
and to enforce the resulting outcome.  
Individuals in many societies can and do act on their own – such as deciding on contributions 
to the public good – without the need for the group to aggregate individual preferences. In 
addition, in many settings, individuals discontented with the contribution levels of their peers, 
can choose to unilaterally provide and enforce sanctioning institutions.3 It is, therefore, perhaps 
more natural to take individual actions as the starting point in analysing the ability of groups 
to endogenously provide and enforce potentially efficiency-enhancing institutions such as 
sanctioning.  
In this paper, we experimentally examine the provision and effectiveness of the sanctioning 
institution in a public goods game when its provision depends on individuals acting 
independently. Will individuals unilaterally choose a punishment role? If so, what is the effect 
on group outcomes in comparison to when the sanctioning institution is exogenously and 
                                                          
1 Other early works on this issue are Yamagashi (1986), where subjects were offered the possibility to voluntarily 
fund a sanctioning institution in a public goods game and Ostrom et al. (1992), where in a common pool resource 
game, subjects had the opportunity to communicate to decide whether to use sanctions. Traulsen et al. (2012) and 
Zhang et al. (2014) find that many players choose pool punishment when second order punishment of non-
punishers is possible.  
2 Gürerk et al. (2006), Ertan et al. (2009) and Sutter et al. (2010) are examples where the choice is between no 
sanctions versus informal sanctions. In Kosfeld et al. (2009) and Kube et al. (2015), the choice is between no 
sanctions and formal sanctions imposed by a central authority. Markussen et al. (2014) and Kamei et al. (2015) 
are recent studies where the choice is between formal and informal sanction schemes. 
3 There are alternative institutions other than sanctioning that can be implemented. Some examples are rewards 
for high contributors (Sefton et al. 2007), ostracism of low contributors (Cinyabuguma et al. 2005), excludability 
(Croson et al., 2014), leadership within groups (van der Heijden et al. 2009) and formation of coalitions 
(Dannenberg et al., 2010 and McEvoy et al., 2011). Kube et al. (2015) study the endogenous provision of 
institutions that include both minimum contribution levels and centralised sanctioning.  
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universally provided? Finally, how is the effectiveness of the institution changed if individuals 
must unilaterally bear the cost of providing it?  
In our experiment, before making decisions on contributions, individuals unilaterally decide 
whether or not they want to be able to use punishment. The number of such individuals is then 
announced before the contribution stage takes place. Finally, contribution levels are made 
public and only those individuals who gave themselves the “right” to make use of sanctioning 
can assign punishment to any group member.4 This is akin to the behaviour of vigilantes who 
take it upon themselves to provide mechanisms to enforce a norm and punish others who violate 
it or some voluntary neighbourhood watch groups that provide both monitoring and 
sanctioning. An obvious behavioural question is whether group members will respond 
differently to a sanctioning mechanism that has been exogenously provided to all group 
members in comparison to one in which individuals act unilaterally to choose to provide the 
mechanism. 
We consider two variants of the sanctioning institution where individuals choose-to-participate 
(CTP) - whether the choice to participate is available at no monetary cost (CTP0) or whether 
there is a positive cost (CTP1).5 In addition, we replicate the most common settings in public 
goods experiments – the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) and the VCM with an 
exogenously provided opportunity to punish (StdPun). In the VCM setting, subjects could only 
contribute to the public good and there was no enforcement mechanism available. In StdPun, 
all group members automatically had the right to assign punishment to others in the group. 
Based on the standard assumption of own income maximization, individuals would not be 
expected to provide the sanctioning institution or to use it to discipline free-riders. However, 
previous work has found that individuals do make use of exogenously provided sanctioning 
institutions and are able to enforce high cooperation levels in groups. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
hereafter FS, rationalise such behaviour using a model of inequity aversion. Extending their 
model to our setting, we find that, as in FS, any symmetric contribution profile can be supported 
                                                          
4 A related paper is Masclet et al. (2013), where subjects can make non-binding threats before the contribution 
stage. Players issue costless detailed threats to other group members as a function of hypothetical contribution 
levels and these threats are made public before making contribution decisions. They find an increase in 
contributions relative to a standard VCM.   
5 Using standard economic terminology, the punishment technology may entail a fixed per round provision cost 
associated with acquiring and having the technology ready to use, and a variable cost associated with making use 
of it. The standard approach in the literature is linear variable cost with no provision cost (as in Herrmann et al., 
2008). Some papers, though, consider a positive provision cost but the decision to provide the sanctioning 
institution is taken at the group level (see for example Kosfeld et al., 2009). 
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as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. However, this requires everyone in the group – selfish 
and inequity averse players – to provide the sanctioning institution. In addition, there exist sub 
game perfect equilibria with less than complete provision where only a subset of inequity 
averse players provide the institution. However, to account for the pecuniary inequity that 
arises from the different participation decisions, contribution profiles in such equilibria are 
asymmetric.   
One may think of the CTP settings as allowing for extreme cases that correspond to the 
provision cost of the sanctioning institution. When the provision cost approaches infinity, no 
player will choose to sanction and the institution will resemble the VCM. When the provision 
cost approaches zero as in CTP0, then all players may choose to give themselves the right to 
sanction and the institution will resemble StdPun. In the intermediate range however, the FS 
model predicts a multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes with a wide range of contribution levels 
and participation in the punishment stage. It is such situations that our experiment allows us to 
investigate. 
Our experimental data shows several monotonic results. When the provision of the sanctioning 
institution is costly, fewer subjects choose to participate in the punishment stage than when it 
is costless. In terms of the effects on cooperation, while both CTP treatments start at the same 
level, cooperation levels in the two CTP treatments soon diverge. In CTP0, groups are as 
successful in raising cooperation as with automatic universal participation in punishment 
(StdPun). In CTP1, despite the fact that some players do provide the sanctioning institution, 
groups are unable to raise cooperation levels and contributions to the public good stagnate at 
levels close to those observed in the VCM setting. However, complementary to these general 
patterns, there are a number of additional findings that greatly enrich the picture. 
First, in the costless treatment, there is less than full provision of the sanctioning institution; in 
only 10% of all occasions did all group members choose to participate in the punishment stage 
and the overall average participation rate is 60%. The literature on voting on punishment 
systems in public good games sheds some light on this result (see for example, Gurerk et al., 
2006, and Ertan et al., 2009). First, not all groups succeed in implementing the punishment 
regime and second, in those cases that the group implements the punishment system, the 
institution is not always unanimously approved (majority rule is usually used).6 This means 
                                                          
6 Gerber et al. (2013) find that a unanimous participation rule is the most effective at increasing the number of 
implemented institutions.  
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that some subjects are not in favour of sanctioning others as an institution. In our CTP settings, 
these subjects (selfish players that will never find it rational to punish) may choose to not take 
on the punisher role, leaving that role for the inequity averse players that will ultimately be 
responsible for making the threats to punish credible.7   
Second, monotonicity holds between and within the CTP settings. On one hand, the average 
number of subjects providing the institution is larger in CTP0 than in CTP1. This suggests that 
the law of demand previously reported in the literature with respect to variable punishment 
costs (Anderson and Putterman, 2006, and Carpenter, 2007) extends to fixed provision cost.8 
On the other hand, within each CTP treatment, there is a positive relation between the number 
of players choosing to provide the institution and group contribution levels. This result suggests 
that the threat to punish was credible in both CTP treatments.  
Third, controlling for the number of participants, contributions in CTP0 are higher than in 
CTP1. The question is why the development of credible punishment threats increases 
contributions in the costless setting to a larger extent than in the costly one. In CTP1, the 
participation decision is strongly contingent on having been punished in the previous round. 
This is not true in CTP0. Further, in regard to the use of sanctioning, subjects are found to 
punish high and low contributors with virtually the same intensity in CTP1, but not in StdPun 
or in CTP0. This suggests that “blind revenge” (Ostrom et al. 1992) is a larger factor in CTP1, 
diminishing the efficacy of targeted punishment of low contributors, the key element for raising 
contributions. 
Fourth, an individual’s decision to provide the sanctioning institution is not found to be strongly 
correlated with his/her contribution decision. This suggests that individuals’ cooperation 
decisions depend more on the persistent existence of a sanctioning institution and less so on 
whether they themselves provide the institution. 
                                                          
7 There is a branch of the literature that analyses the performance of the sanctioning institution in VCM settings 
where exogenously provided punishment networks limit punishment opportunities, as well as the information 
subjects receive on contributions and punishment imposed/received (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2012, Fatas et al., 2010 
and Leibbrandt et al., 2015). Carpenter et al. (2012) find that the complete network, where everybody can punish 
everyone, is more efficient than incomplete networks that restrict punishment opportunities to a subset of subjects. 
Leibbrandt et al. (2015) examine complete vs. incomplete punishment networks, but in a setting where there are 
fixed identifiers across rounds that allow subjects to receive complete information about all other subjects in their 
group regarding contribution and punishment decisions. They find that the structure of the punishment network 
significantly affects allocations to the public good and that network configurations are more important than 
punishment capacities.  
8 Although in a different context, there are studies showing that zero is a special prize, in the sense that people 
perceive the benefits associated with free products as higher (Shampanier et al., 2007). 
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Finally, in CTP1, the experimental value of the cost of providing the sanctioning institution 
was negligible - a twentieth of an individual’s initial endowment. After completing the initial 
experiments mentioned above, we conducted a variant of the costly treatment, CTP5, in which 
the cost of participation was higher than in CTP1. We find essentially the same patterns in 
punishment and cooperation behaviour as in CTP1. This suggests that the mere existence of a 
provision cost hinders the development of an effective sanctioning institution. The reason for 
this result appears to be related to both a decrease in the level of participation in, and use of, 
the sanctioning institution.  
To our knowledge, no previous study explicitly examines treatment conditions with both 
positive and null provision costs of providing a sanctioning institution. There is, however, some 
prior indirect evidence. Both in Gürerk et al. (2006) - where players can vote with their feet 
whether to be in a society with or without punishment - and in Ertan et al. (2009) - where the 
group decides whether punishment is allowed using a majority rule - the provision cost of the 
sanctioning institution is zero and it is effectively chosen with positive effects on contributions 
and efficiency levels. Kosfeld et al. (2009) consider a positive provision cost in a setting in 
which players voted for implementing the institution. The provision cost, however, is borne by 
only those who voted for provision. They find that punishment is successfully implemented by 
a large number of groups.9  
Our results indicate that an endogenous sanctioning institution can raise contributions, even 
without full provision. The persistent participation of players (in CTP0, the average 
participation rates of the players with the first and second highest number of decisions to 
participate are 93% and 81%) and punishment targeted at low contributors are found to be 
behind the successful implementation of the institution. However, our results also suggest that 
endogenous institutional change can be a very fragile process that is sensitive to subtle 
institutional details; in our case, to the existence of a positive provision cost. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 details our experimental design and 
procedures. Section 3 theoretically explores the effects of a participation cost and presents our 
hypotheses. Section 4 presents and discusses our results, including results from the additional 
treatment designed to explore the effect of a more substantial participation cost, and Section 5 
                                                          
9 In studies where the subjects’ choice is between formal and informal sanctioning (Markussen et al., 2014, and 
Kamei et al., 2015), the cost of providing the formal mechanism affects the choice: formal sanctions are more 
popular when they carry no up-front cost, whereas informal sanctions are more popular and efficient when 
adopting the formal scheme entails such a cost.    
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concludes. Appendix A of the online material contains the experimental instructions and 
Appendix B contains additional analysis used to support results presented in the paper. 
Appendix C presents an analysis of individuals’ final earnings in relation to the inequity-
aversion model.  
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The base game in our experiment was a standard Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). 
In the VCM, a group of n ≥ 2 players repeatedly plays a linear public goods game with just one 
stage - a contribution stage. Each player i (i = 1, 2, …, n) begins each round with an endowment 
of y tokens in a private account from which he/she can allocate 𝑔𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, y} to a group 
account, i.e., the public good. The balance, 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑦 −  𝑔𝑖, remains in the private account and 
earns a return of 1. Each player in the group receives aG from the group account where 𝐺 =
 ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the total contribution to the public good and a (0 < a < 1 < an). The monetary payoffs 
to player i in a round are given by 
𝜋𝑖(𝒈) = (𝑦 − 𝑔𝑖) + 𝑎𝐺 
where 𝒈 is the profile of contributions to the public good. The Nash equilibrium in the stage 
game is for each player to contribute nothing to the public good (𝑔𝑖 = 0  ∀ i = 1, 2, …, n) while 
the social optimum is for each player to contribute his/her entire endowment to the public good 
(𝑔𝑖
∗ = 𝑦  ∀ i = 1, 2, …, n). The Nash equilibrium and the social optimum remain unchanged 
under finite repetitions of the stage game.  
In games with punishment, players can also use their earnings from the contribution stage of 
the game to punish other players in a subsequent punishment stage. Let 𝑝𝑘𝑙  denote the 
punishment player 𝑘 sends to player 𝑙, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑙. A unit of punishment imposed on a player costs 
the punishing player c units (0 < c < 1).10 Denoting the punishment profile in the group by 𝒑, 
a player’s monetary payoff in a period is given by 
𝜋𝑖(𝒈, 𝒑) = (𝑦 − 𝑔𝑖) + 𝑎𝐺 − 𝑐 ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
− ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑖  
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
. 
                                                          
10 We use the notation from FS, in particular regarding the description of the punishment technology. 
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Individual contributions to the public good at the Nash equilibrium and at the social optimum 
in the punishment game (in one-shot and finitely repeated games) are identical to those in the 
game without punishment, i.e., zero and full contributions respectively. In addition,  𝑝𝑘𝑙 =
0 ∀ 𝑘, 𝑙 at both the Nash equilibrium and at the social optimum. 
In all treatments, there were 20 rounds with fixed groups and a contribution stage with 𝑛 = 4, 
𝑦 = 20, and 𝑎 = 0.5. At the end of the contribution stage, each subject was informed of her 
group’s total contribution to the public good in that round, the individual contributions of the 
others in her group in descending order and her individual earnings from her private account 
and from the public good. Subjects did not have individual identifiers that could create 
reputation effects.  
In the first treatment (VCM), a round ended after the contribution stage. In all other treatments, 
subjects played a punishment game after the contribution stage. The second treatment was the 
standard exogenously provided sanctioning institution (StdPun), as in Gächter et al. (2008). In 
this treatment, after the contribution stage, subjects could use their earnings from the 
contribution stage to reduce the earnings of each other, up to a maximum of 5 tokens for each 
other group member.11 The term punishment was not used. For brevity here, however, we will 
refer to such reductions as punishment. All four subjects in a group automatically entered this 
stage, where they decided how much punishment to assign, if any, to each of the others in their 
group. Thus, while the assignment of punishment was endogenous, participation in the 
institution itself was exogenously imposed for all group members, and at no cost. The 
punishment technology used was 1:3, i.e., one token used to punish a group member cost the 
punishing member 1 token and the recipient 3 tokens (i.e., 𝑐 = 1/3 in terms of FS notation). 
The costs of assigning and receiving punishment were deducted from earnings from the 
contribution stage.12 After the punishment stage, subjects were informed of the total amount of 
punishment they received and their earnings from both stages of the round. Because no subject 
identifiers were used, subjects could not associate punishment received with the particular 
group member who assigned the punishment.  
The CTP treatments endogenised the provision of the sanctioning institution. Each group 
member was required to choose, in each round, whether or not to provide the sanctioning 
                                                          
11 cf. Sefton et al. (2007) where subjects were given an additional endowment for punishment.   
12 If a player’s earnings from the contribution stage was lower than 15 tokens, punishment was limited by his 
earnings. A player could have negative earnings in a round, but could not earn negative amounts in the experiment.  
10 
 
institution, i.e. to participate in the punishment stage in a round. Prior to the contribution stage, 
each subject chose whether to participate in the punishment stage that followed the contribution 
stage.13 Subjects had to pay a fee, 𝛾 ≥ 0 , to provide the institution. Before making contribution 
decisions, subjects were informed only of the number of people in their group who had chosen 
to participate in the punishment stage. Only those who indicated a willingness to participate in 
the punishment stage in a round could assign punishment after the contribution stage in that 
round. These subjects could then punish any other group member, i.e., all group members could 
receive punishment, regardless of their choice in the initial stage. If no subject in a group chose 
to participate in the punishment stage in a round, the round ended after the contribution stage.  
The study included two initial CTP treatments. In CTP0, the decision to participate in the 
punishment stage was costless (𝛾 = 0) and the institution was provided for free to each group 
member who chose to participate. In CTP1, each group member choosing to participate in the 
punishment stage paid a fee of 1 token, i.e., 𝛾 = 1. The fee was deducted from the earnings of 
the subject after the contribution stage and before the punishment stage. This was done to 
ensure that a subject who gave herself the right to punish could contribute as much to the public 
good as could a subject who chose not to participate in the punishment stage. The punishment 
technology-parameters were the same as in StdPun.  
Table 1 summarises the initial treatments and presents the number of observations in each. 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) show that punishment is significantly more effective in raising 
contributions to the public good under partner matching than under stranger matching. Hence, 
partner matching allows more room for exploration of the effects of intermediate treatments 
between VCM and StdPun. Further, each group forms an independent observation under 
partner matching while each session forms an independent observation under stranger 
matching. While avoiding the risk of potential contamination of subjects in an entire session, 
partner matching also allows us to maximise the number of independent observations.  
All sessions were conducted at EssexLab at the University of Essex. In each session, 12 to 24 
subjects, recruited from the student body at Essex were randomly and anonymously assigned 
to four-person groups that stayed fixed throughout the 20 rounds. The repeated nature of the 
game and the partner matching within groups was common information for all subjects. At the 
                                                          
13 We used neutral language in the instructions and never referred to “contributions” or “punishment”. In Stage 1, 
subjects were asked “Do you want to make decisions in Stage 3?”  
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beginning of each session, instructions for the 20-round public goods game were read out by 
an experimenter. Subjects also had a copy of the instructions that they could refer to at any 
time during the experiment. Subjects then took a quiz to ensure understanding. They could not 
proceed until all questions were answered correctly. Subjects then made decisions privately at 
their computer terminals. At the end of the session, subjects answered a demographic 
questionnaire.    
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In all treatments, the stage 
game was repeated for 20 rounds and earnings from a round could not be carried forward to 
future rounds. Subjects were paid their earnings from all 20 rounds of the public goods game. 
Tokens were converted to Pounds at the rate of 60 tokens to £1. A session lasted about 55 
minutes and subjects earned an average of £12.35 each including a £2.50 show-up fee.  
3. Cooperation with Endogenous Institution Provision: Theoretical Predictions 
Past studies have shown that cooperation can be sustained when the contribution stage is 
followed by a punishment stage. One approach to rationalising this finding is by using social 
preferences à la FS, that are defined in terms of final monetary outcomes. To guide in the 
analysis of the observed behaviour, we extend the FS setting to our endogenous provision game 
and seek to identify behavioural regularities that can generate testable hypotheses.  
 
3.1 Institution Provision and Punishment by Inequity Averse Individuals 
FS consider groups composed of selfish and inequity averse players. For a profile of monetary 
payoffs (𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑛), the utility to an inequity-averse player 𝑖 is 
𝑢𝑖(𝜋1, … , 𝜋𝑛) = 𝜋𝑖 −
𝛼𝑖
𝑛 − 1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖, 0} −
𝛽𝑖
𝑛 − 1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋𝑖 − 𝜋𝑗, 0}
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
 
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑗≠𝑖
 
where 𝛼𝑖 measures the utility loss to player i associated with disadvantageous inequality and 
𝛽𝑖  measures the utility loss associated with advantageous inequality, with 𝛼𝑖 > 𝛽𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖 ∈
[0,1]. FS show that any symmetric contribution level 𝑔 (ranging from 0 to full contribution) 
can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome if there is a group of 𝑛’ 
“conditionally cooperative enforcers”, with 1 ≤ 𝑛′ ≤ 𝑛  such that: 
12 
 
(𝑎) 𝛽𝑖 ≥ 1 − 𝛼, and 
(𝑏) 𝑐 <
𝛼𝑖
(𝑛−1)(1+𝛼𝑖)−(𝑛
′−1)(𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖)
 for 𝑖 = 1, 2 … , 𝑛’. 
Condition (𝑎)  assures that enforcers dislike advantageous inequality and do not find 
contribution of zero to be a dominant strategy (they are conditionally cooperative). Condition 
(𝑏) assures that enforcers experience a utility loss associated with disadvantageous inequality 
and thus find it optimal to punish free riders contributing 𝑔′ < 𝑔 by choosing 𝑝∗ =
𝑔−𝑔′
𝑛′−𝑐
. This 
way, potential non-contributors find it optimal to contribute in the first stage.  
In this section we extend the FS setting by adding an initial acquisition stage. The game is now 
composed of three stages: 
Stage 1 - Acquisition decisions: players choose whether to acquire the punishment technology 
to be used in Stage 3. The acquisition cost is 𝛾 ≥ 0. 
Stage 2 - Contribution decisions: Upon observing decisions in Stage 1, players choose 
contributions levels. 
Stage 3 - Punishment decisions: Upon observing decisions in Stage 2, those players who 
acquired the punishment technology in Stage 1 can punish any member of the group. 
Compared to the FS setting, the sequential addition of a costly provision of punishment 
modifies two things. First, players can condition their contribution and punishment decisions 
on the participation decisions in Stage 1. We will use this feature to construct subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria that use the contribution stage to “punish” deviations from the prescribed 
participation decisions. Second, if a player has spent 𝛾  on acquiring the punishment 
technology, the monetary payoff (before punishment) to this player decreases by the amount 
𝛾. Given that inequity averse players base their punishment behaviour on relative concerns, 
asymmetries in participation decisions will carry over to the punishment stage when 𝛾 >
0, prompting punishment even if contributions are equal.  
This second point above is crucial. Note that if player 𝑖  has invested in the punishment 
technology and player 𝑗 has not, then prior to any punishment, the monetary payoffs to players 
𝑖  and 𝑗  are 𝜋𝑖(𝑔) = (𝑦 − 𝑔𝑖 − 𝛾) + 𝑎𝐺  and 𝜋𝑗(𝑔) = (𝑦 − 𝑔𝑗) + 𝑎𝐺 , respectively. And the 
payoff difference 𝜋𝑗 − 𝜋𝑖 amounts to (𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾) − 𝑔𝑗. From the point of view of punishment 
behaviour, having spent 𝛾 on the acquisition of the punishment technology and contributed 𝑔𝑖 
13 
 
is equivalent to having contributed 𝑔𝑖 + 𝛾.
14 This implies that (i) the optimal punishment points 
in Stage 3, based on the equalization of monetary payoffs after punishment between the 𝑛’ 
punishers and the punished, needs to be adjusted to 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
(𝑔𝑖+𝛾)−𝑔𝑗
𝑛′−𝑐
 and (ii) the condition that 
ensures that enforcers find it optimal to punish is the same as in FS (condition (𝑏) above). This 
follows because the decision to punish or not only depends on preferences and the cost of 
punishment, as contributions and acquisition costs are sunk in Stage 3. 
Armed with these two concepts, we perform an equilibrium analysis of the game. An important 
quantity will be ?̂?, defined as the minimum number of conditionally cooperative enforcers 
required to sustain cooperation. Assuming that the inequity averse players in the group are 
symmetric, e.g. they share the same values of 𝛼 and 𝛽, then from condition (𝑏) we find 
?̂? = 𝑖𝑛𝑡 [1 +
(1 + 𝛼)(𝑛 − 1) −
𝛼
𝑐
𝛼 + 𝛽
] + 1 
Note that 𝑛’  and ?̂?  need not be equal. For some parameter values, for example, if 𝑐 <
𝛼
(1+𝛼)(𝑛−1)
, the numerator of the fraction in the definition of ?̂? is negative and therefore ?̂? = 1, 
i.e., one enforcer is enough to make the punishment threat credible, even if there are 𝑛′ > ?̂?  
such enforcers in the group. 
We first show that for every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in FS with symmetric 
contribution level 𝑔 ∈ [0, 𝑦] , there exists an equivalent equilibrium in our setting. By 
equivalent we mean a perfect equilibrium with full participation and the same contribution 
level 𝑔. Consider the following strategy: 
 In stage 1, participate, i.e. provide the sanctioning institution. 
 In stage 2, if all players participated, then contribute 𝑔. Otherwise, contribute zero if you 
did participate; if you did not participate, contribute zero if the number of conditionally 
cooperative enforcers who are participants is smaller than ?̂?; otherwise contribute γ.  
 In stage 3, if all players participated and contributed 𝑔, then do not punish. If all players 
participated but there were deviations in the contribution stage, then play according to FS.15 
If participation is less than full, and there were no deviations in the contribution stage, then 
                                                          
14 But it is not equivalent in terms of the level of the public good provided by the group. 
15 See Proposition 5 in FS, and its proof.  
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do not punish if you participated; if there were deviations in the contribution stage, play 
according to FS. 
The novel part of this strategy is in Stage 2. Deviations from the prescribed participation 
behaviour are deterred by threatening to play the “worst” subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the FS setting: participants contribute nothing; non-participants contribute γ if the number of 
conditionally cooperative enforcers with the punishing mechanism is at least ?̂? and contribute 
nothing otherwise. The reason the contribution decision needs to be conditional on the 
participation decision and the number of enforcers who have participated is that in the case that 
the punishment threat is credible, non-participants will contribute γ to avoid being punished. 
This strategy is subgame perfect because it follows a FS subgame perfect equilibrium strategy 
to avoid deviations in stages 2 and 3 and a FS subgame perfect equilibrium strategy that 
implements the lowest contribution to enforce participation decisions in stage 1. 
Lemma 1. For every subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the FS setting, there is an outcome 
equivalent subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with full participation in the endogenous costly 
provision game. 
In our setting, there also exist subgame perfect Nash equilibria with less than full provision of 
the sanctioning institution. To see this, consider an adaptation of the previous strategy that 
starts by having a subset 𝑛’ of conditional cooperative enforcers participating in Stage 1 and 
the remaining players not participating. Then, the strategy follows by requiring a contribution 
of 𝑔 + 𝛾 for those not participating and a contribution 𝑔 for participants. Deviations in the 
participation stage would be punished by resorting to the worst Nash Equilibrium of the 
contribution stage (as in the previous strategy) while deviations in the contribution stage would 
be punished by sending the corresponding punishment points (as in the previous strategy). 
Lemma 2. The endogenous costly provision game also has subgame perfect Nash equilibria 
with less than full participation, ?̂? ≤ 𝑛′ < 𝑛 . In this case, the profile of contributions is 
asymmetric if 𝛾 > 0: participants contribute 𝑔 ∈ [0, 𝑦 − 𝛾] while non participants contribute 
𝑔 + 𝛾. 
One might argue that a focal strategy is the natural separation between inequity averse and 
selfish players: inequity averse players acquire the punishment technology while selfish players 
do not acquire it but increase their contribution over the level of participating players to avoid 
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any pecuniary advantage that would be punished. But this focal equilibrium does not maximise 
the group payoffs if the number of conditionally cooperative enforcers in the group exceeds 
the threshold ?̂?. The most efficient equilibrium would be the one in which the number of 
participants is kept to the minimum ?̂?, maximising the level of contributions to the public good 
at minimal costs. 
Lemma 3. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that maximises the group payoff is the 
asymmetric equilibria where ?̂? conditionally cooperative enforcers participate and contribute 
y−𝛾 and non-participants contribute 𝑦.   
3.2 Hypotheses 
The above analysis provides us with some guidance to analyse the data from our experiment. 
Notice, in the first place, that the model based on FS has multiple equilibria, both in terms of 
the number of participants providing the sanctioning institution and of the contribution levels. 
Precise predictions thus require the application of some refinements. We start with predictions 
on participation, i.e., provision of the sanctioning institution. For the parameter values in the 
experiment, 𝑛 = 4 and 𝑐 = 1/3, the numerator in the definition of ?̂? (the minimum number of 
enforcers required to successfully implement cooperation) is positive, (1 + 𝛼)3 − 3𝛼 = 3, 
implying that one enforcer is not enough in the experiment to sustain a cooperative outcome. 
As the case where the cost of providing the sanctioning mechanism is zero can be considered 
to be analogous to the standard punishment mechanism, and given that players successfully 
coordinate in StdPun, we hypothesize successful coordination in CTP0, which requires at least 
two enforcers.  
Hypothesis 1. The number of players providing the sanctioning institution in CTP0 is at least 
two.  
When acquisition is costly, there are two arguments that point in the direction of lower 
participation in CTP1 than in CTP0. The first one is efficiency which, according to Lemma 3, 
requires the minimization of the number of players providing the sanctioning institution in 
CTP1. The second is that a positive acquisition cost changes the out of equilibrium payoffs –
because it affects the punishment points sent in Stage 3 – and this has been shown to adversely 
affect the equilibrium selection process (see discussion below).  
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Hypothesis 2. The number of players providing the sanctioning institution in CTP1 is smaller 
than in CTP0. 
We do not expect instant coordination on a subgame perfect equilibrium, but an adjustment 
process towards one, if any. In this process, off-equilibrium play will play an important role. 
In this respect, the existence of a positive acquisition cost 𝛾 implies that the optimal number of 
punishment points to non-participants 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
(𝑔𝑖+𝛾)−𝑔𝑗
𝑛′−𝑐
 is increasing in 𝛾. 
Hypothesis 3. For those providing the sanctioning institution, the mean level of punishment 
imposed on group members is higher in CTP1 than in StdPun or in CTP0. 
Turning to the targets of punishment, previous studies suggest that for punishment to increase 
group contributions, it must be targeted effectively at low contributors to “encourage” higher 
contribution levels (see, for instance, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In line with these studies, we 
expect that those with lower than average contributions to the public good will be targeted for 
punishment. 
Also, there are out-of-equilibrium profiles that trigger rational “antisocial” punishment in the 
sense of punishment sent by a player to another player who has contributed more. This will 
happen when 𝛾 > 𝑔𝑗 − 𝑔𝑖 > 0. This rational antisocial punishment will be more frequent, i.e., 
in more contribution profiles, the larger the acquisition cost 𝛾. This suggests that, for a given 
level of punishment, some of that punishment will be diverted away from low contributors and 
directed towards above average contributors in CTP1. 
Hypothesis 4. Punishment is targeted at below average contributors in all punishment 
treatments. While punishment of above average contributors cannot be ruled out, punishment 
of low contributors is crowded out by anti-social punishment only in CTP1. 
An issue is the contribution levels to which play will converge. In this respect, a zero 
acquisition cost should not present any additional challenge to players over the standard FS 
setting (recall lemma 1). Hence, we expect successful coordination in CTP0, similar to StdPun. 
Hypothesis 5. Contribution levels are similar in StdPun and in CTP0. Further they are both 
significantly higher than in VCM. 
Lemma 2 poses some challenges to players on the coordination problem when the acquisition 
cost is positive. Now, there are two classes of subgame perfect Nash equilibria: symmetric 
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equilibria in which all players participate and contribute the same amount, and asymmetric 
equilibria. In the FS game, the criteria of symmetry and efficiency select full contribution as 
the unique prediction of the game. In our case, symmetry and efficiency do not go hand in 
hand, rendering the task of coordinating on an equilibrium more complex. The introduction of 
an acquisition cost increases the size of punishment and antisocial punishment, thus changing 
payoffs off the equilibrium path (in equilibrium there is no punishment). In coordination games, 
changes in off-equilibrium payoffs are known to affect the equilibrium selection process (see 
Cooper et al. 1990). Further, as shown in Rand et al. (2010), and as seen in Hermann et al. 
(2008), the presence of significant anti-social punishment can prevent the evolution of 
cooperation. There are thus two behavioural channels through which the existence of an 
acquisition cost negatively affects the selection of the equilibrium with the highest contribution 
level. 
Hypothesis 6. Contributions in CTP1 are lower than in StdPun and in CTP0. 
Nailing down the level to which contributions converge in our game is a complex issue as there 
are many different equilibria. The problem is exacerbated when the game is repeated, even over 
a finite number of periods as the complexity of the strategies grows exponentially. It is well 
known that if the stage game has a multiplicity of equilibria, outcomes that do not correspond 
to any equilibrium of the stage game can nevertheless be observed in the repeated version.  
A final word about the minimum number of enforcers ?̂? required to successfully implement 
cooperation. As shown, at least two enforcers are required to successfully implement 
cooperation in our treatments. This means that if there is only one enforcer, the punishment 
institution is not credible and the corresponding contribution level is 0. Therefore, the 
sanctioning institution will not support positive contribution levels. 
Hypothesis 7. One enforcer will not credibly enforce the sanctioning institution and therefore 
no cooperative outcome can be supported. 
In summary, we hypothesise that the exogenously provided sanctioning institution (StdPun) 
will be effective in raising contributions over levels observed in VCM. In addition, we 
hypothesise that the institution is provided to a lower extent when its provision is costly. We 
expect that effective sanctioning institutions will be provided by at least two individuals in 
CTP0 and that they will be will be as effective in CTP0 as in StdPun. However, we do not 
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expect the emergence of effective sanctioning institutions that can successfully raise 
cooperation in CTP1.16  
4. Results 
The presentation of results is organised around the testing of Hypotheses 1 through 7. However, 
we also present additional results that are related to the repeated nature of the decision setting. 
Unless otherwise stated, Mann-Whitney (hereafter MW) tests are used to make comparisons 
across treatments.17 Because subjects did not have information about other groups, each four-
person group represents an independent decision-making unit. For these tests, an observation 
is thus the mean (averaged over all 20 rounds) per-round variable (e.g. contribution, 
punishment or earnings) by each group in a treatment. The results are organized around the 
initial treatments. Section 4.5 reports the results from the CTP5 treatment that was conducted 
as a test of robustness of the initial treatments. 
 
4.1 Institution Formation by Individuals  
Figure 1 presents the mean number of members choosing to provide the sanctioning institution 
(providers) over time in the two CTP treatments. Aggregating across rounds, Table 2 presents 
the distribution of groups according to the number of participants in the punishment stage.  
Figure 1 and Table 2 show that the average number of members providing the sanctioning 
institution in CTP0 is larger than 2. While there are very few rounds (2.31%) with zero 
participants, full provision is observed in only 10% of rounds. The mean number of participants 
in CTP0 is 2.41, i.e., about 60% of group members consistently provide the sanctioning 
institution. We therefore find support for Hypothesis 1.  
Result 1: The opportunity to choose to provide the sanctioning institution leads to an average 
participation rate greater than 2 in CTP0.  
                                                          
16 We do not present hypotheses on differences in efficiency across treatments. These depend on the magnitudes 
of punishment used relative to the increases in contributions. Moreover, punishment has been shown to lead to a 
clear efficiency increase only in very long repeated decision settings (Gächter et al. 2008). 
17 The results are robust to t-tests. We rely on the nonparametric tests to avoid making assumptions about the 
distribution of our data. All t-tests are available from the authors on request. 
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As Figure 1 shows, after the initial decision rounds, the average number of participants in the 
punishment stage is consistently lower in CTP1 than in CTP0. Table 2 shows that there is a 
shift in the distribution towards the lower end in CTP1 relative to CTP0. As shown, there are 
very few rounds with four participants in CTP1. In particular, there are 4 participants in only 4 
percent of all decision rounds and 3 participants in only 13 percent of all decision rounds. The 
mean number of participants per-round is 1.60 in CTP1and this is significantly lower than 2.41 
in CTP0 (p = 0.0040, n = 13).18   
To examine persistence at the individual level within groups, individuals are ranked in each 
group by the number of rounds in which they chose to participate in the punishment stage (1 = 
individual with the largest number of participation rounds in the group, 4 = individual with the 
smallest number of participation rounds in the group). Figure 2 presents the average number of 
rounds in which individuals of each rank chose to provide the institution.  
As Figure 2 shows, individuals in the first three ranks choose to participate in the punishment 
stage in a greater number of rounds in CTP0 than in CTP1. MW tests confirm that the 
differences are significant (p = 0.0177, 0.0002 and 0.0179 for ranks 1, 2 and 3 respectively). 
Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 2. 
Result 2: Average participation is lower in CTP1 than in CTP0. Individuals provide the 
punishment institution more persistently in CTP0 than in CTP1. 
In summary, in almost all decision rounds, fewer than four individuals choose to provide the 
sanctioning institution in both CTP treatments. Further, the introduction of a positive 
acquisition cost, though negligible, significantly reduces provision.  
4.2 Use of the Sanctioning Institution 
4.2.1 Amount of punishment used 
Figure 3 (a) presents, across decision rounds, the mean frequency with which those providing 
the sanctioning institution assign punishment to others in their groups and Figure 3 (b) presents 
the mean amount of punishment assigned by those providing the sanctioning institution. We 
adopt the convention that the number of players providing the institution in StdPun is four. 
                                                          
18 The mean is also significantly lower than four (p = 0.0000). 
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Conditional on providing the institution, Table 3 presents the mean frequency of punishment 
and mean “per-capita” punishment imposed by those in the punishment role in each of the 
punishment treatments. In addition, it also presents mean aggregate punishment imposed at the 
group level in each treatment.  
Both Figure 3(a) and Table 3 show that, those providing the institution are more likely to use 
punishment in CTP1 than in StdPun or in CTP0. MW tests confirm that the frequency of 
punishment is significantly higher in CTP1 than in StdPun (p = 0.0350) and in CTP0 (p = 
0.0502). However, the difference between StdPun and CTP0 (p = 0.4626) is not significant.  
Figure 3(b) and Table 3 show a similar pattern for the mean amount of punishment used by 
those providing the institution, i.e., per-capita punishment. MW tests show that per-capita 
punishment is significantly greater in CTP1 than in StdPun (p = 0.0377), but that the difference 
between StdPun and CTP0 is not significant (p = 0.2767). However, MW tests also show that 
the difference between CTP1 and CTP0 is not significant (p = 0.1278). Thus, we find mixed 
support for Hypothesis 3.19  
Result 3: Frequency of punishment by individuals providing the institution is significantly 
higher in CTP1 than in StdPun and somewhat higher than in CTP0. "Per-capita" punishment 
levels are significantly higher in CTP1 than in StdPun, but similar in CTP0 and CTP1. 
4.2.2 Targeting of Punishment  
When analysing punishment behaviour, we follow Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Sefton et al. 
(2007) and focus on deviations of an individual’s contribution from the average contribution 
of the others in the group. Figure 4 (a) shows the observed frequency with which an individual 
receives punishment in a round when the deviation of their contribution from the average 
contribution of the other three members of their group in that round is negative and when it is 
non-negative. Conditional on being punished, Figure 4 (b) shows the mean punishment 
received by individuals in a round as a function of their deviation in that round.  
 
                                                          
19 While we do not have a hypothesis on aggregate punishment at the group level, Table 3 shows that aggregate 
punishment is highest in StdPun and is lowest in CTP0. However, the combination of lower participation rates 
and higher per-capita punishment in CTP1 renders all paired comparisons between treatments statistically 
insignificant (MW p > 0.50 in all cases).  
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Figure 4 (a) shows that across all punishment treatments, those with negative deviations are 
punished more frequently than are those with non-negative deviations. Based on Sign-rank 
tests, the difference in the frequency of being punished between negative and non-negative 
deviations is significant in StdPun (p = 0.0029) and CTP0 (p = 0.0019), but is not significant 
in CTP1 (p = 0.1239). Figure 4 (b) yields a similar result. In all cases, those with negative 
deviations receive more punishment than do those with non-negative deviations. Based on 
Sign-rank tests, the difference in absolute punishment received between negative and non-
negative deviations is significant in StdPun (p = 0.0218) and CTP0 (p = 0.0033), but not in 
CTP1 (p = 0.3465). 20, 21  
Similar to previous studies examining sanctioning institutions, the results reported above 
indicate that negative deviations are targeted for punishment in all punishment treatments. 
However, the frequency and amount of anti-social punishment in CTP1 is similar to that of 
punishment directed towards to those with below average contributions. We thus find support 
for Hypothesis 4.22  
Result 4: In StdPun and in CTP0, negative deviations are punished more severely and more 
often than are positive deviations. In CTP1, however, the difference in frequency and intensity 
of punishment between negative and positive deviations is not significant.  
Rand et al. (2010) show that significant anti-social punishment can lead to negative reactions 
and the prevalence of “spiteful defectors”. In order to more fully understand differences in 
CTP0 and CTP1 with regard to choosing to participate in the punishment stage, we estimate 
individual level Probit regressions where the dependent variable is 1 if the individual chose to 
participate in the punishment stage in the round and is zero otherwise. The independent 
variables are a dummy for participation in the previous round, the lagged (absolute) deviation 
of the individual’s contribution from the average contribution of the others in the group and 
round dummies. To investigate if “blind revenge” or “anti-social behaviour” is a factor (Ostrom 
                                                          
20 For these tests, an observation is the difference between the average (over all 20 rounds) punishment, or 
frequency of punishment, received by those with negative deviations and those with non-negative deviations in 
each group in a treatment. The number of observations in each treatment is thus equal to the number of 
independent groups in that treatment (see Table 1). Sign-rank tests are used to examine if this difference is 
statistically different from zero.  
21 The result is robust to finer partitions of the range of negative and non-negative deviations and to regression 
analysis.  
22 While the relevant test for Hypothesis 4 requires a comparison of differences within each treatment as reported 
above, we also compared the frequencies and means of punishment received by those with negative and positive 
deviations across treatments. Those with negative deviations are punished more frequently in StdPun than in CTP0 
(p = 0.0043) and in CTP1 (p = 0.0393). All other differences are not significant. 
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et al., 1992, and Hermann et al., 2008), we also include the amount of punishment received by 
the individual in the previous round and the number of other participants in the punishment 
stage in the previous round.23 To further check if revenge plays a role if received punishment 
was “anti-social” or “pro-social”, we run separate regressions for non-negative and negative 
lagged deviations. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4. For all regressions, we 
report robust standard errors clustered on independent groups. For the sake of brevity, the 
coefficients of the round dummies are not reported.  
The regressions suggest that there is strong path dependence in both CTP treatments in regard 
to participation; subjects who participate in one round are more likely to participate in the next 
round. However, the amount of punishment received in a round is a strong predictor of 
participation in punishment in the following round only in CTP1.24 Further, this is the case 
whether a player’s contribution was below or above the average contribution level of others in 
the previous round.25  
Result 4a: Those who are punished are more likely to choose to participate in the punishment 
stage in the next round in CTP1, but not in CTP0.  
Result 4a is complementary to Result 4, which showed that there is significant anti-social 
punishment only in CTP1. Result 4a suggests that those choosing to participate in the 
punishment stage in CTP1 may have a greater tendency toward blind revenge or spite, targeting 
high contributors. The combination of these two results suggests that, in CTP1, the punishment 
of low contributors is crowded out by punishment targeted at those with positive deviations, 
leading to less effective use of punishment in increasing group contributions.  
There is evidence from the field that a fear of retaliation prevents people from using punishment 
in the first place (Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012 and Balafoutas et al., 2014). While 
retaliation seems to be a significant driver of punishment in CTP1, there is no evidence that 
                                                          
23 When senders of punishment can be identified, there is evidence that players engage in targeted counter-
punishment even in the same period (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007, Nikiforakis, 2008 and Nikiforakis et al., 2012) 
or in targeted revenge in the next period (Leibbrandt et al., 2015). In our setting, subjects were unable to identify 
who they received punishment from. Hence, we restrict attention to “blind” revenge.  
24 This result also holds when the independent variable is a dummy for receiving any punishment rather than the 
amount of punishment received. These regressions are presented in Table B1 in Appendix B.  
25 A possible explanation is that subjects find punishment to be a “hostile” act in CTP1, regardless of whether it 
is ‘pro-social’ or ‘anti-social’ punishment. Subjects could take it more personally if someone else has paid for the 
right to punish them, and thus set out to take (blind) revenge. Unfortunately, our data do not allow a test of this 
conjecture.  
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punishment is lower in CTP1 or that it declines over time. Indeed, Result 3 suggests that 
punishment use is higher in CTP1 than in StdPun and/or in CTP0. Results 4 and 4a suggest 
that subjects in CTP1 engage in “blind feuds” that lead to cycles of counter-punishment 
(Nikiforakis, 2008 and Nikiforakis et al., 2012) over multiple rounds of the game, resulting in 
counter-productive use of the sanctioning institution.26  
However, we do not find evidence consistent with such multi–period feuds when participation 
in the sanctioning institution is costless; revenge or retaliation are not found to be strongly 
correlated with sanctioning in CTP0. Why then do we observe evidence of feuds only in CTP1? 
One possible reason is that the simple introduction of the monetary cost to the right to punish 
changes the attitude of participants toward other group members’ contribution and sanctioning 
decisions.27  
4.3 Effectiveness of Endogenously Provided Sanctioning Institutions 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the evolution of mean group contributions and earnings (both 
measured in tokens) over time. Since the initial endowment in each round was 20 tokens per 
individual (80 for the group) and all costs were paid out of this in all treatments, differences in 
earnings across treatments directly capture differences in efficiencies across treatments. Table 
5 presents summary statistics of per-round group contributions and earnings.  
Focusing first on contributions to the group fund, in all treatments mean contributions start at 
approximately 40 tokens (50% of the group’s endowment). Thereafter, contributions in the 
VCM and StdPun treatments follow a pattern similar to other studies examining these 
treatments (see, for instance, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In VCM, they steadily decline over the 
course of the game to about 15 tokens (about 20% of endowment). In StdPun, they rise to 
around 60 tokens (75% of endowment) by round 5 and stay at that level throughout the rest of 
the game. The trajectory of contributions in CTP0 is very similar to that in StdPun.  
MW tests support the observations made above. Compared to VCM, group contributions are 
significantly higher in StdPun (p = 0.0056) and in CTP0 (p = 0.0004). However, contributions 
                                                          
26 Related to feuds is the literature on vendetta games,  Abbink and Hermann (2009) find that fear of retaliation 
reduces money burning in groups of four, thus reducing the emergence of ‘pointless vendettas’. Bolle et al. (2014), 
however, find widespread retaliatory vendettas in stealing games in groups of two, leading to significant efficiency 
losses.  
27  There is evidence that the introduction of money reduces social distance among players and increases 
opportunistic behaviour (Vohs et al., 2006). 
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in StdPun and in CTP0 are not significantly different from each other (p = 0.4146). We thus 
find support for Hypothesis 5.  
Result 5: Averaging across all 20 rounds, aggregate contributions are similar in StdPun and 
in CTP0. Moreover, they are both higher than in VCM.  
Mean contributions in CTP1 start similar to those in the other punishment treatments. They 
begin to rise in the first 2-3 rounds. While contributions in StdPun and CTP0 continue to rise, 
in CTP1 they then remain relatively flat throughout the game, above those in VCM but below 
those in the other two punishment treatments. However, they are closer to levels observed in 
VCM than in the other two punishment treatments. MW tests show that group contributions in 
CTP1 are not significantly different from those in VCM (p = 0.1069) and that they are 
significantly lower than in both StdPun (p = 0.0296) and in CTP0 (p = 0.0171). Thus we also 
find support for Hypothesis 6.  
Result 6: Averaging across all 20 rounds, group contributions in CTP1 are significantly lower 
than in StdPun and in CTP0. Moreover, they are not significantly different from contributions 
in VCM.  
We next investigate to what extent increases in contributions to the group fund are linked to 
those who persistently choose to provide the sanctioning institution in their groups. Figure 6 
presents mean contributions (over all 20 rounds) of individuals in each participation rank, as 
defined above (see Figure 2).28  
The figure suggests that there is no difference in individual contributions by participation rank 
in CTP0. This is confirmed by an OLS regression (reported in Table B2 in Appendix B) where 
the dependent variable is an individual’s mean contribution over all 20 rounds and the 
independent variables are dummies for participation rank within the group (excluded category: 
rank 4). None of the rank dummies is significant at the 10% level. In CTP1, the figure suggests 
that average contributions do not differ across the last three ranks but the average contribution 
of individuals with rank 1 is higher than that of the rest. However, an OLS regression (in Table 
B2 in Appendix B) shows that this difference is not significant. As above, none of the rank 
                                                          
28 We do not present time trends of contributions of providers and non-providers. This is because an individual 
can be a provider in some rounds and non-provider in others. Calculating aggregate contributions by providers 
would thus involve potentially a different set of players in each round. Hence, we calculate separate averages for 
each individual in a group. 
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dummies is significant.29 It thus appears that, in both CTP treatments, group contributions do 
not differ between those who participate persistently and those who do not.  
However, there is a difference between the two CTP treatments in contributions by 
participation rank. Figure 6 also shows that mean individual contributions are higher in CTP0 
than in CTP1 for each participation rank. MW tests show that this difference is not significant 
for rank 1 individuals (p = 0.2087) but is significant for each of the other three ranks (p = 
0.0096, 0.0129 and 0.0647 for ranks 2, 3 and 4 respectively). 30  Thus providers of the 
sanctioning institution are more effective at raising contribution levels across ranks in CTP0 
than in CTP1.  
Result 6a: Within each CTP treatment, group contributions are not significantly different 
between those that choose more often to provide the sanctioning institution and those that do 
less so. However, the contributions of those who provide the sanctioning institution are higher 
in CTP0 than in CTP1. 
While we do not have a hypothesis on group earnings or efficiencies, we nevertheless look at 
earnings ex-post. When comparing earnings across treatments, we account for the costs of 
punishment in the three treatments that allow players to punish each other. Figure 5(b) implies 
that these costs are substantial in the initial few rounds of the game. In the first five rounds, 
earnings in VCM are the highest while there is no discernible difference across the punishment 
treatments. In the remainder of the decision rounds, group earnings are lowest in CTP1 and are 
highest in CTP0. There is no systematic difference between earnings in VCM and earnings in 
StdPun. Further, they both lie in between earnings in the two CTP treatments. This is evident 
from the mean earnings in Table 5 as well. Mann-Whitney tests show that, across all 20 rounds 
the only pairwise comparison with a significant difference is the one between CTP0 and CTP1. 
In particular, group earnings are significantly higher in CTP0 than in CTP1 (p = 0.0129). 31 
                                                          
29 In the OLS regressions in both treatments, the constant is positive and significant and is equal to the mean 
contribution of the rank 4 individual presented in Figure 6. The result is robust to individual-level panel random 
effects regressions (not reported) that include the above independent variables and lagged contributions and round 
dummies.  
30 Similar to Figure 6, we also created two figures of individual distributions with each rank in CTP0 and CTP1. 
The first was distributions of mean absolute individual contributions, while the second was distributions of mean 
individual deviations from the average contribution of the other three members of the group. Neither figure 
suggests any differences between treatments in any of the four ranks.  
31 Focusing on the last 10 rounds, earnings in CTP0 are significantly higher than in CTP1 (p = 0.0019) and VCM 
(p = 0.0053), but not significantly different than in StdPun. 
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Result 6b: Averaging across all 20 rounds, mean group earnings in the three punishment 
treatments are very similar to earnings in VCM. Earnings in CTP1, however, are significantly 
lower than in CTP0.  
Thus, we find that the sanctioning institutions provided by individuals in CTP0 are as effective 
as when there is universal and exogenous participation in the sanctioning institution, i.e., in 
StdPun. However, the sanctioning institutions that emerge endogenously in CTP1 are not 
effective at raising contributions to the public good. The use of the sanctioning institution that 
emerges in CTP0 outperforms that in CTP1 in terms of both contributions and efficiency.  
4.4 Contributions: Level and Persistence of the Sanctioning Institution  
The previous results show that a smaller number of members provide the sanctioning institution 
in CTP1 compared to CTP0 and that contributions are lower in CTP1 than in CTP0. In terms 
of group outcomes, the question becomes to what extent contribution levels vary with the 
number and persistence of participants in the punishment stage. To examine this issue, Figure 
7 presents mean contributions of groups according to the average number (over 20 rounds) of 
participants in the sanctioning institution. Recall, in StdPun, the number of participants is four 
in every round since all players automatically enter the punishment stage and is zero in the 
VCM treatment. The horizontal lines for these two cases represent reference points for average 
contributions. 
Figure 7 provides evidence that group contributions increase with the average number of 
players persistently providing the sanctioning institution. Group level panel regressions 
(reported in Table B3 in Appendix B) of group contributions on lagged contributions, the 
lagged amount of punishment used and the number of providers confirm the positive 
relationship in both CTP treatments.  
Importantly, Figure 7 also provides evidence that group contributions in CTP0 are as high as 
in StdPun when at least 2 participants provide the sanctioning institution. MW tests confirm 
that mean contributions in groups with at least two providers in CTP0 (n = 10) are not 
significantly different from group contributions in StdPun (p = 0.5097). However, mean 
contributions in groups with fewer than two providers in CTP1 (n = 9) are significantly lower 
than in StdPun (p = 0.0330).  
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Note that comparisons between StdPun and groups with fewer than two providers in CTP0 or 
groups with at least two providers in CTP1 are not very meaningful due to the small number 
of observations in the CTP treatments. In CTP0, 77% of the groups have at least two persistent 
providers of the sanctioning institution while in CTP1, only 31% have at least two persistent 
providers. A proportions test shows that this difference between the two CTP treatments is 
significant (n = 13 groups in each; two-sided p = 0.0183). 
Result 7: Groups contributions in CTP0 and CTP1 are significantly and positively correlated 
with the number of group members providing the sanctioning institution. Moreover, group 
contributions in CTP0 are as high as in StdPun when at least two players consistently provide 
the institution.  
4.5 The Effect of a Non-negligible Participation Fee 
In CTP1, the participation fee of one token is negligible. Nevertheless, it is still positive. Thus, 
CTP1 allows us to test if the mere presence of a positive price impacts behaviour and efficiency. 
The results discussed above show that when subjects have to pay to acquire the punishment 
technology, the sanctioning institution is provided to a significantly lower extent. Moreover, 
the use of the institution and group outcomes are very different. The experiments discussed in 
this section examine the extent to which the impact of requiring a positive price to provide the 
sanctioning institution varies with the magnitude of the price. In an additional treatment 
(CTP5), the participation fee was raised to 5 tokens, one-quarter of a subject’s per-round 
endowment. All other details were identical to those in CTP1. 
Three sessions of CTP5 were conducted at EssexLab, each lasting approximately 55 minutes. 
The average earnings of a subject in this treatment was £12 including a £2.50 show-up fee. 
Data were collected on 11 independent groups.  
Figure 8 presents the mean number of members providing the sanctioning institution across 
rounds in CTP1 and CTP5. As an additional reference, the figure also presents the information 
for CTP0. As shown, the monotonicity argument continues to hold; participation in the 
punishment stage steadily declines as the cost of participation rises. The mean number of 
providers in a round in CTP5 was 0.36 (st. dev. = 0.24). Based on an MW test, this is 
significantly lower than the average of 1.6 participants in CTP1 (p = 0.0005).  
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Based on MW tests, the following additional conclusions can be drawn. As a result of the low 
rates of provision of the sanctioning institution, the average punishment used by a group in a 
round was also significantly lower in CTP5 than in CTP1 (2.42 vs. 5.35, p = 0.0238). However, 
mean individual punishment by providers in CTP5 was significantly higher than in CTP1 (5.55 
vs. 3.26, p = 0.0051) and in CTP0 (5.55 vs. 2.16, p = 0.0001). Finally, as in CTP1, the 
punishment of individuals with negative deviations from the group’s average contribution are 
crowded out by punishment of those with positive deviations in CTP5. While individuals with 
negative deviations from the group average were punished more often than were those with 
non-negative deviations (in 17% of the instances vs 15%), this difference is not significant (p 
= 0.9292). Conditional on receiving any punishment, those with negative deviations received 
3.9 tokens in punishment while those with non-negative deviations received 3.66 tokens in 
punishment. Once again, this difference is not significant (p = 0.7221).32 
Figures 9 (a) and (b) show, respectively, the mean group contributions and mean group 
earnings over time in both treatments. As shown, the patterns of contributions and earnings are 
quite similar across decision rounds. The mean per-round group contribution and group 
earnings in CTP5 were 40.10 tokens and 108.16 tokens respectively (the corresponding 
standard deviations were 19.01 and 23.73). Neither of these is significantly different from those 
observed in CTP1.33 
The results from CTP5 lend support to the overall robustness of the effect of a positive price 
for providing the sanctioning institution. In particular, patterns in contribution, participation 
and aggregate punishment decisions closely mirror those observed in CTP1. Further, they also 
support Hypothesis 3 that an increase in the acquisition cost increases “per-capita” punishment 
by providers and Hypothesis 4 that a positive provision cost leads to significant anti-social 
punishment. 
                                                          
32 See Figure 4 for the corresponding values for CTP1. The unit of observation is the difference in average (over 
all rounds) punishment, or frequency of punishment, received by those with negative deviations and those with 
non-negative deviations in each group. n = 11 for both tests.  
33 For the corresponding values in CTP1, see Table 5. As before, MW tests are used to compare contributions and 
earnings between treatments. The unit of observation is the mean (over all 20 rounds) per-round group contribution 
or earning for each group in a treatment. Thus, n = 13 in CTP1 and n = 11 in CTP5.  
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Result 8: The effects of a positive acquisition cost on the formation of sanctioning institutions 
by individuals and their effectiveness in raising contributions are robust to non-negligible 
acquisition costs.  
5. Conclusions 
The decentralised sanctioning institution is one of the most widely studied solutions to the free-
rider problem in public goods games (for a recent review of the literature see Chaudhuri, 2011). 
Given the second-order free-riding problem (Yamagishi, 1986), an important issue is the 
emergence of the institution. Unlike previous studies that have explored exogenous provision 
of the institution or group choice as to whether to adopt the institution, this study explores the 
willingness of individuals to unilaterally provide and make use of the sanctioning institution.  
We find that individuals are willing to unilaterally provide the institution in their groups. 
However, the level of utilization and effectiveness of the institution varies importantly as to 
whether the provision cost is zero. When provision is costless group members consistently 
provide the institution for themselves, although not at an individual rate of 100%. Further, in 
this case, the sanctioning institution is as effective as when it is exogenously and universally 
provided. Punishment is effectively targeted at low contributors, raising contributions to the 
public good.  
We also find, however, that if provision of the institution requires the payment of even a 
minimal fixed cost, provision and effectiveness of the sanctioning institution decline. In the 
presence of a negligible monetary cost, the number of individuals who are willing to provide 
the sanctioning institution is insufficient to raise cooperation. Further, in this case, revenge 
appears to be a greater reason for individuals choosing to participate in the sanctioning 
institution. This motive renders punishment ineffective as punishment of low contributors is 
crowded out to a greater degree by punishment of high contributors resulting from blind 
revenge.   
How do these experimental results, including ours, inform us about behaviour in the field 
characterised by social dilemmas and punishment possibilities? It is our view that the stylized 
experimental settings for linear public goods games with and without punishment are but 
idealised constructs that help us understand basic incentives and behaviour. The most critical 
idealisations concern the free flow of noiseless information on contributions among all 
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participants (for the VCM) and the free availability of the punishment technology (for the 
StdPun). Although one can find real life situations that meet these conditions, for example 
norm violation in a public space and punishment by telling violators off (Nikiforakis, 2008), in 
many others these idealisations are compromised and it is here where our experimental study 
is informative.   
The most direct real world examples to come to one’s mind with no free availability of the 
punishment technology is that of vigilantes or security patrols - individuals who make an 
investment to organize themselves and who, in the absence of any sanctioning institution, 
voluntarily and unilaterally assume the task of punishing norm violators. This example 
implicitly includes one key feature of our design: the public announcement of norm 
enforcement. This would correspond to vigilantes publicly patrolling the streets with the 
instruments of punishment in their hands (e.g. guns or radio transmission devices to alert the 
police). There are other cases, less dramatic, also characterised by involved individuals 
stepping out and making public commitments to enforce a norm. An example is the case of 
honour codes at schools or colleges with students publicly announcing that they would turn in 
classmates for cheating/plagiarism. 34  Similarly, in the political arena, there are cases of 
political parties publicly announcing that they would prosecute any other party who engaged 
in corrupt activities. In Spain, this was the case for UPYD – Union, People and Democracy - 
for the last ten years.35 Our results are informative of behaviour in such situations.  
In a seminal work, Ostrom et al. (1992) established that “self-governance is possible” in groups 
faced with a social dilemma. Since then, other work has examined the effectiveness of 
exogenously provided sanctioning institutions across a diverse set of treatment conditions and 
in situations where the institution is adopted at the group level through voting mechanisms. 
Our study adds to this literature.  
We find that individuals acting unilaterally may be able to provide a form of “governance” in 
their groups and raise cooperation levels. However, we also find that the sanctioning institution 
provided by individuals can be fragile. The results reported here point to the important role that 
                                                          
34 It is the personal experience of one of the authors at a graduate school in the UK in the mid nineties, where 
some written exams were conducted without any official monitoring. It was common for students to warn others 
not to cheat in the exam or they would be reported to the instructor immediately. 
35 Unfortunately, this party has run out of money (and electoral support) and has issued a public statement some 
months ago that they would stop prosecuting other parties. 
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participation costs may play in the willingness of individuals to provide a sanctioning 
institution and, importantly, in how it is used. 
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Figure 1. Mean number of providers of the sanctioning institution 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Persistence in participation by individuals  
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Figure 3. Mean frequency of punishment and mean punishment by providers 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Frequency and amount of punishment received by individuals   
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Figure 5. Mean Group Contributions and Earnings 
 
Note: Group earnings at the Nash equilibrium are 80 tokens. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean individual contributions over all 20 rounds by rank of participation in 
the sanctioning institution   
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Figure 7. Mean group contributions by number of members providing the institution 
 
Note: The number of participants is not always a whole number since it is an average over 20 rounds. Figures in 
parentheses are the number of groups in each category. There are 13 groups in each of the CTP treatments.  
 
 
Figure 8. Mean number of participants in the punishment stage – CTP treatments  
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Figure 9. Mean Group Contributions and Earnings in CTP1 and CTP5 
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Table 1. Summary of initial treatments 
Treatment 
Punishment 
Opportunity 
Participation in 
Punishment Stage 
Punishment  
Participation 
Cost 
Number of 
subjects 
(groups) 
VCM No - - 40 (10) 
     
StdPun Yes All, automatically  - 48 (12) 
     
CTP0 Yes 
Only those who 
choose to in Stage 1 
0 tokens 52 (13) 
     
CTP1 Yes 
Only those who 
choose to in Stage 1 
1 token 52 (13) 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of the number of providers per group across rounds and mean 
participation in the punishment stage (all 20 rounds)36  
 % of rounds 
# providers CTP0 CTP1 
0 2.31 16.15 
1 15.38 28.85 
2 31.54 38.08 
3 40.77 12.69 
4 10 4.23 
Mean Level 2.41 1.60  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Figures in the table are percentages of groups in each category. Each group yields 20 observations, one for each 
round. Thus, each group could be in multiple categories. For instance, a group might have had 3 participants in 
punishment in round 10 but 2 participants in punishment in round 15.  
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Table 3. Punishment Means (standard deviations) at the Group Level  
  Obs 
Frequency of 
punishment 
Per-capita 
Punishment 
Aggregate Group 
Punishment 
StdPun 12 0.371 1.739 6.958 
  (0.268) (1.592) (6.369) 
     
CTP0 13 0.471 2.156 4.931 
  (0.208) (1.403) (2.791) 
     
CTP1 12 0.624 3.258 5.35 
  (0.187) (1.912) (3.792) 
NOTE: There are only 12 observations in CTP1 since there was one group where no one ever provided the 
sanctioning institution.  
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of participation in the punishment stage 
 Non-negative lagged 
deviations 
Negative lagged 
deviations 
 CTP 0 CTP 1 CTP 0 CTP 1 
Whether participated in  2.240*** 1.665*** 1.892*** 1.441*** 
the last round (0.183) (0.157) (0.218) (0.148) 
     
Amount of punishment 0.011 0.076*** -0.021 0.087** 
received in the last round (0.041) (0.028) (0.051) (0.035) 
     
Lagged absolute deviation from the  0.001 0.012 -0.012 -0.004 
average contribution of others (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
     
Number of other participants -0.024 -0.055 0.003 0.029 
in the last round (0.105) (0.115) (0.171) (0.161) 
     
Constant -0.710* -0.849** -0.551 -1.625*** 
 (0.424) (0.333) (0.496) (0.343) 
Observations 702 580 286 408 
Dep. variable: = 1 if the choice was to participate in punishment stage and = 0 otherwise in each round. Std. errors 
clustered on independent groups in parentheses. Includes round dummies (not reported). *** - sig. at 1% level, ** - 
sig. at 5% level, * - sig. at 10% level.  
The higher number of observations in the regressions for non-negative lagged deviations indicates that there were 
more instances where individuals’ contributions were at least as high as the average contribution of the others in 
the group. It does not indicate that there were more instances of ’anti-social’ punishment than ’pro-social’ 
punishment – the data includes observations where individuals received zero punishment.  
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Table 5. Means (standard deviations) at the group level measured in tokens 
  Obs Contributions Earnings 
VCM 10 31.01 111.01 
  (14.212) (14.212) 
    
StdPun 12 60.021 112.188 
  (20.472) (41.311) 
    
CTP0 13 60.639 120.915 
  (11.935) (18.555) 
    
CTP1 13 43.931 100.931 
  (18.103) (19.897) 
 
